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Unequal Hopes, Lives, and Lifespans in 
the USA: Lessons from the New Science 
of Well-Being
Introduction
I use well-being metrics – a new measurement tool in economics 
– to explore questions that standard income-based metrics do not 
answer. While standard income metrics use observable choices, 
such as consumption decisions, as the basis of analysis, there are 
many situations where it is difficult for any individual to exercise 
a choice. My research focuses on two areas. One is the welfare 
effects of macro and institutional arrangements that individuals 
cannot change, like inequality or stagnant unemployment rates. An 
example of this is the high (20) percentage of prime-age males who 
have simply dropped out of the labor force. While our standard 
indicators highlight record lows in the unemployment rate, these 
individuals are no longer even in the calculation. If an individual 
has not actively looked for a job in the past six months, he or 
she drops out of the overall pool from which the rate is derived. 
(Graham 2017) Therefore, they simply disappear from the story 
that standard metrics tell.
My second area of research focuses on behaviors driven by imposed 
norms, addiction, or self-control problems, rather than by informed, 
rational choices. I often use the example of someone from a lower 
caste in India who does not send their child to school. That is not a 
choice, but rather a result of strongly imposed norms: if someone 
is in a lower caste, they will always be in a lower caste. If that is the 
child’s fate, why send him or her to a school that is dirty, dangerous, 
and expensive? That decision is not a revealed preference—but 
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rather the result of a lack of choice. We can measure the well-being 
effects of such choice—or lack thereof—with these metrics.
Most of my career has involved traveling around the world to some 
of the worst slums, looking at poverty and inequality, micro-level 
coping strategies under bad macro conditions, and, more recently, 
the happiness and well-being among some of the poorest people in 
the poorest places in the world. For almost a decade, though, I have 
been coming back to the U.S. and thinking, “What is it that makes 
me more depressed about poverty here than in these other very 
poor places? What is going on?”
Eventually, I decided to take time to understand the U.S. trends 
better. I found myself asking why Americans, even poor Americans, 
do not seem to care about inequality when we are by most 
definitions one of the most unequal countries in the world. In 
part, this is because the standard data and measures do not tell a 
dynamic story about poverty and inequality, and they certainly do 
not show intergroup inequality, which is what people really care 
about.
I decided, given that we have had historic increases in inequality, 
as well as stagnant poverty levels for several decades, to tell the 
story of poverty and inequality in the U.S. from the perspective of 
the metrics of happiness and well-being. I thought the story would 
resonate more with people, and particularly non-academics, if it 
were a message about unequal hope, happiness, and stress. My 
research—and the book that resulted—found that inequality is 
part of this story, but not the only part. The story was much more 
complicated than I anticipated. One of the most interesting parts 
of the story includes different levels of hope and resilience across 
races and places. Poverty and inequality play a big role, but there is 
much more to it.
Carol Graham
3
New Metrics for Looking at Inequality of Outlooks and 
Outcomes: Economics of Happiness/Well-Being
I am going to talk about the latest research I have done on premature 
mortality in the U.S., and how I match those trends with metrics of 
desperation, stress, and anger. I will also discuss the latest research 
on hope and resilience, explain what determines each, why it 
matters, and why it differs across populations. Before doing so, let 
me tell you a little bit about the resources that we use to measure 
inequality.
I started the research with a very simple concept, the pursuit of 
happiness. When Thomas Jefferson included this concept as a 
central tenet in the Declaration of Independence, he was grounded 
in Aristotle’s definition of happiness and in Mill’s conception of 
liberalism, which combines social fairness with individual effort. 
It is not about guaranteed contentment, but about the right of 
all individuals to seek fulfilling lives. The basic question I asked in 
my book, Happiness for All? Unequal Hopes and Lives in Pursuit 
of the American Dream, published by Princeton last year, was “Is 
the American dream and the right to the pursuit of happiness still 
available to all citizens today?” Maybe it never was, but I believe 
it was more widely available decades ago than it is now, for many 
reasons I will discuss later on.
My research explores why increasing distributions of income, well-
being, and hope matter today, and why they will matter more in 
the future. The 2016 election, which woke us up to an anger and 
frustration in this country that we did not even know existed, was a 
stark marker. An even starker one is the rising premature mortality 
rates due to preventable deaths, such as drug overdose and suicide 
among less-than-college-educated Whites—the so-called “deaths 
of despair.”
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How Should We Measure Well-Being?
Happiness is paramount in discussions of well-being, and therefore, 
gets the most public attention. While it sells books, it is also one 
of the least well-defined terms for research purposes. There are a 
plethora of meanings behind it. It could mean happiness today—
“Are you happy today?”—but it could also be referring to happiness 
with life as a whole. These two examples alone are very different 
concepts.
We have a completely new science of well-being measurement that 
brings much more clarity to these questions. It started as a very 
nascent collaboration between economists and psychologists, and 
at the time, I was one of the early scholars involved in this study. 
I was able to work with others in the field like Danny Kahneman, 
Dick Easterlin, and George Akerlof. These collaborations were 
initially met with skepticism by mainstream economists, but have 
now become quite a force in the field. We now have geneticists, 
biological scientists, and medical doctors working alongside us. It 
has been exciting to work in what is now a burgeoning area for 
understanding a host of public health issues and other problems. 
We can answer questions as diverse as the effects of commuting time 
on well-being, why cigarette taxes make smokers happier, and why 
the unemployed are less unhappy with higher local unemployment 
rates. Economists would say that if someone is unemployed and 
there is a higher local level unemployment rate, their predicted 
probability of being re-employed later is lower. Yet, the average Jane 
or Joe does not sit around calculating their predicted probability of 
anything, and if there are more unemployed people around them, 
they feel less stigmatized.
The basic analytical approach in economics is based on observed, 
revealed preferences, such as consumption choices. This is based 
on the assumption that we cannot believe what people say in 
surveys—as there is no consequence to what they say—but we can 
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believe what people do if they make a consumption choice within 
a fixed budget constraint—which therefore has consequences and 
trade-offs. But in reality, some people make bad consumption 
choices to keep up with the Joneses, while others consume badly 
due to addiction and self-control problems. There is now much 
evidence suggesting that consumption decisions are not much 
better than survey data. Over time as we have used more survey 
data, we have found consistent patterns in how people answer 
these surveys, particularly about their well-being.
Indeed, I have spent a lot of time simply trying to get good data on 
income and poverty rates for different countries around the world. 
The gold standard for collecting income data in poor countries is 
the usage of expenditure surveys, where the researchers ask how 
much people have spent in the last month. This data is incredibly 
noisy because we are asking people who do not have a paycheck 
to tell us what they earned in the last month. Plus, there are often 
tax consequences to reporting income in these contexts, and thus 
strong incentives to under-report. Yet there is also no real incentive 
to lie to a survey about your well-being. As such, economists are 
now increasingly using survey data, which has opened the door to 
the study of hosts of questions that standard income metrics and 
revealed preferences questions cannot answer.
Terminology: From Bentham to Aristotle
I already mentioned that the word happiness is not a very well 
defined term. In my book, The Pursuit of Happiness: An Economy 
of Well-Being, there is a section in the first chapter titled “Should 
We Have Bentham or Aristotle in the Statistics Office?” I pose this 
question and conclude that we should have both. We can easily 
measure these two distinctions of well-being and they tell us very 
different things about people’s lives.
Hedonic well-being measures how people experience their daily 
lives. Is their mood positive or negative? Were they smiling or 
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worried yesterday as they commuted, spent time with friends, or 
worked? British philosopher Jeremy Bentham defined happiness 
as the most contentment possible for the greatest number of 
individuals in society. This is a concept, which primarily reflects the 
hedonic concept of happiness, which is how people experience 
their daily lives. (Stone and Mackie, 2013)
We also measure evaluative well-being, which is based on life 
satisfaction questions such as, “How satisfied are you with your 
life as a whole?” This correlates closer with income than general 
happiness or with hedonic well-being, because respondents are 
evaluating their life circumstances as a whole. For example, if 
someone is young, they tend to think about what their life will be 
like as they answer these questions. If someone is old, they will 
usually look back on what they have achieved—if they were able 
to lead a life that they wanted to and if they had choices in life. 
Not surprisingly, answers to these evaluative life questions are 
more closely associated with income than to hedonic well-being. It 
does not mean that more money leads to higher scores, but rather 
people with means will answer higher on these questions, in large 
part because they have more choices in life. They have the ability to 
choose to be an artist, a professor, or a banker.
We have also started to measure the Aristotelian, or eudaimonic, 
dimension of happiness. We explicitly ask whether people have 
purpose or meaning in their lives explicitly. That is a new area. 
However, in the absence of these questions, the life satisfaction 
question largely picks up that dimension of life.
The Method and the Patterns
Wit = α + βxit + εit
Above is a simple equation, that by definition, shows that we are not 
asking people if unemployment makes them unhappy, or if eating 
ice cream makes them happy (although it likely does). Instead, 
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we take these large sample sizes of millions of people around the 
world, in the data from the Gallup Organization, as well as a handful 
of other large-scale surveys. The Gallup World Poll, for example, 
has surveyed approximately 1000 people per country per year in 
162 countries around the world, while the Gallup Healthways poll 
surveys 1000 individuals per day throughout the U.S. Both polls 
are nationally representative where they are fielded, and have an 
extensive set of questions on well-being in addition to the usual 
socio-economic and demographic data, such as respondents’ age, 
income, gender, occupation, health, and marital status, and region. 
We take the reported well-being of individual i at time t (when they 
are answering the survey). This type of question needs to be asked 
up front in the surveys, because we do not want to ask somebody 
about their life satisfaction after several questions about their 
satisfaction with their job or their marriage, as that would introduce 
bias. Respondents do not know that we are linking that response 
to the other questions we ask them—their demographic traits, age, 
gender, race, where they live (urban or rural), their socioeconomic 
traits, education, employment, and occupation, for example.
The dependent variable in the equation is the well-being of individual 
i at time t and the βxit is the vector of all the demographic traits 
mentioned above. Epsilon, the error term, is also an important part 
of this. Most standard econometrics treat the error term as noise in 
the data that one did not observe or could not explain. However, an 
average of 90% of individual well-being is not explained by anything 
else in this equation, but rather by innate character traits and other 
variables that we cannot observe. Thus, the error term carries a lot 
of information about people’s innate levels of well-being and their 
character traits.
We have used the data from the error term to show how innate 
character traits and unexplained well-being correlates with future 
outcomes, and that individuals who have more innate well-being 
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tend to do better, be healthier, and live longer. The distribution 
of well-being across people is bell-shaped like most normal 
distributions. People considered average are in the bell, but the 
happiest people, and the least happy people, are on the opposite 
sides of the bell, and they are quite different. (Graham and Nikolova, 
2015)
The happiest people care least about money, they love learning 
and creativity, and they do not care if they are employed full time 
or not. The least happy people care most about money, and they 
are not at all resilient to negative shocks. There are very different 
traits on these extremes of the distribution. However, going back 
to the average, what we find in countries of different cultures all 
over the world, is that there are incredibly consistent patterns in 
the determinants of life satisfaction.
Income matters to people’s well-being, as does health. Health 
is more important than income in relative terms, to the extent 
that we can put relative magnitudes or relative weights on these 
coefficients in our equations, and we know that through empirical 
work and anecdotal stories. Employment matters a lot, and so do 
social relationships and marriage.
Two Happy People are Better than One: The Trends
Surveys find that married people are happier than non-married 
people are. In turn, there are a lot of press that have noticed, and 
told everyone that marriage makes people happy. On the contrary, 
marriage is simply an artifact of construction in the data, because 
we have cross sectional data: one observation at one point in time 
and many people. We are finding that married people are happier 
than people who did not marry, in part because happier people are 
more likely to marry each other. Therefore, the causality could run 
in the other direction, and likely does, and the people that did not 
marry are less happy to begin with. (Graham, 2009) As such, we 
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have to be very careful about inferring causality when there is only 
one observation for people at one point in time.
The few findings we have about marriage suggest that over time, 
marriage boosts in happiness last only 18 months. Cahit Guven and 
Claudia Senik, who co-authored the paper You Can’t be Happier 
than Your Wife. Happiness Gaps and Divorce, did have over-time 
data from a large data set for Germans that runs over 20 years. 
(Guven et al., 2012) They found that the probability of divorce was 
highest when the couple had asymmetries in happiness levels. 
Therefore, it is better to have two happy people married to each 
other or two unhappy people married to each other. However, if a 
happy person and a miserable person married each other, they will 
likely not last.
More generally, though, because the basic correlations of 
happiness are so consistent around the world, we can control for 
those. We include these controls in our equations, and then can 
explore the happiness effects of things that vary or change more, 
such as inflation in unemployment rates, inequality, environmental 
quality, and personal behaviors such as smoking, exercising, and 
commuting time. Again, the most important thing to remember is 
that we are not asking people if any of these things make them 
unhappy or happy. We know, for example, how much they smoke 
or how many hours they commute, and we can see variants across 
people who smoke more or less, or commute more or less.
The Curved Data on Age
One more point about the methods. They will make you unhappy 
or happy depending where you are on this curve, but there is a “U”-
shaped relationship between happiness and age. This is controlling 
for age-adjusted health, age adjusted income, and a couple of other 
factors. We do not expect a 75 year old to have the same health as 
a 45 or 25 year old. We are looking at the pure effects of aging.
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Figure 1
What we find in data for Latin America is that the low point is around 
47 years of age. For the US and Europe, it is around 44 years of age. 
(Blanchflower 2008) Out of 162 countries in the Gallup poll, we find 
that this holds for about 130 of them. (Graham and Ruiz-Pozuelo, 
2017)  Where it does not hold is countries where it is harder to age, 
where pension systems are bad, and where it is awful to be sick 
when you are old.
In happy countries like Costa Rica and Denmark, the curve turns 
earlier. People get out of the “U,” and because they have more 
happy life years, they do better over their life course. In places 
where it is harder to age, like Russia, the turning point is about 
60 years old, which is the life expectancy for males. (Graham and 
Ruiz-Pozuelo) One can draw their own conclusions about what is 
happening to the women as they go up the curve after the men die.
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Previously, I mentioned the happiest people and the least happy 
people on this bell-curve distribution. Because the happiest people 
live longer and are happier in general, they have more happy life 
years. Note that there is also something biological going on which 
extends beyond reported happiness. We also find in precisely the 
same set of countries, stress has an inverse “U” turning in this same 
age range. (Graham and Ruiz-Pozuelo, 2017) There are a couple of 
factors contributing to what is going on in these middle-age years, 
which is not that surprising.
During this time, there is an aspirations aligning with realities 
effect. For example, by the time someone is 47 years old, and 
cannot sing or play guitar, he might give up on being a rock star. 
That can be hard. There is also often the double financial burdens 
of teenage kids, college kids, and older or aging parents, which tend 
to come together in these years. Psychologists also have related 
explanations, and discuss emotional wisdom increasing as people 
age.  Therefore, as people age, they become more appreciative of 
life and have fewer emotional swings.
In economic terms, I think about this as the standard deviation of 
bad experiences being much higher when one is younger, because 
the young have had fewer bad experiences to serve as a benchmark. 
However, as one gets older, he has had so many bad experiences, 
that they just roll off his back.
It is also worth noting that this extends beyond humans. Andrew 
Oswald wrote a paper titled “Evidence for a Midlife Crisis in Great 
Apes Consistent with the U-shape In Human Well-Being,” which 
compared the well-being in chimpanzees to humans. He found that 
their cheerfulness also declined at the midpoint of their life years. 
(Oswald et al., 2012) This “U”-curve is incredibly lasting and crosses 
countries, cultures, and people. It also shows how this research 
pulls together biological research, psychological research, and 
economics research.
Lourie Lecture Policy Brief
12
To today’s point, when looking at the U.S. in its current state, a 
significant proportion of Americans are not making it out of this 
“U.” They are primarily less-than-college educated Whites, who 
are dying of preventable deaths due to lack of hope, stress, and 
desperation—all markers of deep unhappiness.
Daily Experience versus Life Fulfillment
If we analyze the two kinds of happiness, daily experience versus life 
fulfillment, part of what we find is that people with more positive 
attitudes about their future and a belief in the future, are happier. 
This tends to be linked with more willingness to invest in the future 
and in better future outcomes in the health, income, and social 
behavior arenas. This is where we find a two-way causality not just 
between better health and more income and happiness, but more 
well-being and happiness seems to result in better outcomes in 
these same areas.
Still, many people have limited future opportunities and low levels 
of well-being, and they have higher discount rates. In economic 
terms, this means they are much more likely to trade off the future 
for the present. If someone does not believe in their future, they 
have limited ability to invest in it, and they are much less likely to do 
so. They tend to focus on daily experiences as they lack the capacity 
to plan. Life is very stressful, due to constant shocks driven by 
circumstances beyond the individual’s control. Our analysis of the 
data shows that this “bad stress” often comes with lack of income, 
education, and opportunity, and is much worse for their well-being 
than is stress associated with goal achievement.
There is some great work by Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir 
in a book called Scarcity, which focuses on very poor countries. If 
we think of the kinds of lives that poor people in the US lead, they 
are not that different. Their lives are also full of negative shocks 
that they cannot control, which ultimately has cognitive effects, 
which makes people lose the capacity to plan going forward. They 
Carol Graham
13
may enjoy daily experiences, they may say they are happy today, 
but they score much lower on life fulfillment questions and have a 
much harder time for a handful of reasons. People with capabilities 
and opportunities are more likely to focus on the longer-term 
dimensions of their lives and the stress they experience, which is 
mitigated by income, education, and hope for the future, and is less 
harmful for their well-being. (Graham and Nikolova, 2015)
Attitudes about Inequality – Are there Two Americas?
I believe that there are two Americas, maybe three, or four, but let 
us start with two. One of the questions I posed early on was, “Does 
U.S. exceptionalism, strong beliefs in the American dream, and lack 
of concern about inequality  still exist today?”
As late as 2001, Americans did not seem to care about inequality. 
There is a great study, by Alberto Alesina and some other colleagues, 
on inequality and happiness which compares the U.S. and Europe. 
They found that in Europe, inequality had modest negative effects 
on reported happiness, and they were strongest for the poor. 
(Alesina et al., 2004)  This makes sense—if there is more inequality, 
people are at the bottom, and it will affect them more.
At the time, the only group in the U.S. that was made unhappy 
by inequality was the left-leaning rich. In 2016, 62% of Americans 
thought their children would be worse off than they were—this has 
since been confirmed in other surveys. The directions of the findings 
are the same, and about 33% think their children will be better off 
than them. These percentages are comparable to countries in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
like Spain and Portugal, but not all countries. In Latin America, only 
13% of Chileans, for example, think their children will be worse off 
than they are. (Graham, 2017)
A much more anecdotal way to get a picture of this theory comes 
from a study by David Leonhardt in the New York Times, based 
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on words and social media. The results showed that depending if 
someone’s home is in an easy area to live in America—northwest 
Washington, Seattle, Portland—or a bad place—Detroit, bad parts 
of St. Louis, Duluth—the words they used are very different.
The common words in poor America are guns, religion, hell, 
antichrist, stress, obesity, diabetes, video games, and fad diets. 
This is very much the combination of a lot of stress, too many 
momentary things, and patched together solutions. In comparison, 
the common words in rich America are iPads, cameras, baby joggers, 
baby Bjorns, foam rollers, cameras, and exotic travel destinations 
like Machu Picchu. (Leonhardt, 2016) These words show more of 
an investment in health and knowledge, investment in children’s 
health and knowledge, and broadening horizons. These could be 
two Americas.
Happiness for All? Unequal Hopes and Lives in the Pursuit of the 
American Dream and Future Research
Some of the data I have collected and examined paints a stark 
picture of unhappiness in the U.S. I am involved in data collection 
efforts from both the Gallup Healthways and World Poll surveys 
(discussed above). Using these data, I compared well-being and 
attitudes about the future in the U.S. and Latin America, a region 
long known for exceptionally high rates of inequality. Then, within 
the U.S., I explored how trends in well-being and ill-being varied 
across racial and socioeconomic cohorts. We next matched those 
trends with CDC data on premature mortality due to “deaths of 




The graph above depicts the question, “Did you experience stress 
frequently yesterday: yes or no.” There is very little error in that 
question, because there are no framing effects. We can see that 
Latin Americans, on average, experience much less stress on a 
daily basis than do respondents in the U.S., but the bigger story is 
different. The poor experience more stress than the rich in Latin 
America, but the difference is not that big. The difference between 
the poor and the rich in the U.S. is almost twice as big. Not only do 
the poor in the U.S. experience much more stress than the poor in 
Latin America, but also much more stress than those that are rich. 
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Figure 3
The graph depicts smiling yesterday. As we can see, Latin Americans 
smile more on a daily basis than Americans do. Again, the big story 
is the difference between the poor and the rich, which is twice as 
big between the rich and the poor in the U.S. as the rich and the 
poor in Latin America. Latin America is a poor place compared to 




 The graph above depicts the question, “If an individual in this 
country works hard, he or she can get ahead: yes or no.” It is the 
classic American dream question. Someone either believes yes or 
no. The results show that Latin Americans, whether they are poor 
or rich answer, the question the same way. However, in the U.S., 
the rich are twenty times more likely than the poor to say hard 
work will get you ahead. As a follow-up to these results a few years 
ago, I began to think about how this varies across poor people of 
different races in the U.S. — my findings here convinced me to 
write a book.
Exploring Race-Income Heterogeneities
Several months before the first study uncovering the deaths of 
despair data came out, I compared poor Blacks, poor Whites, 
and poor Hispanics—those are the three biggest groups. It was 
the time of the Ferguson riots, the Baltimore riots, and a lot of 
concern about the African American community in the U.S. My 
findings, in the graph below, surprised me. With poor Whites as 
the comparator group (scoring 1), we found that poor Blacks were 
almost three times more likely to be optimistic about the future 
than poor Whites, and poor Hispanics were about one and a quarter 
times more optimistic. Poor Blacks are half as likely to report stress 
the previous day as poor Whites, Hispanics a little more than 
Blacks, but still much lower than Whites. There is something more 
fundamental going on here. We know that poor Blacks do not 
experience objectively less stress everyday than poor Whites. They 
are more objectively deprived. So what was going on? I spoke with 
sociologists that worked on African American culture and history. 
There are many hints of differential levels of resilience, but I still did 
not have a fully story. We explored further.
Lourie Lecture Policy Brief
18
Figures 5a and b 
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The graph below simply depicts trends in mortality across countries, 
and shows how only the U.S. mortality rate is going up, and how it 
is driven by non-Hispanic Whites.
Figure 6
All-cause mortality, ages 45-54 for U.S. 
White non-Hispanic (USW), U.S. Hispanics 
(USH), and six comparison countries.
Source: Case & Deaton, 2015
This graph is from Case and Deaton (2015), the first findings of 
the kind. The chart shows U.S. Whites in red and the green line 
is U.S. Hispanics. African Americans are not shown here, but they 
have a slightly higher level of mortality than Hispanics. As we can 
see, in every other country, France, Germany, UK, Canada, Austria, 
Sweden, which are all of comparable income levels, mortality rates 
are going down except for U.S. Whites. 
Upon seeing these results, I asked myself, “Is there a link between 
this and that?” If people are killing themselves prematurely, is it 
due to desperation, lack of hope, or stress? Do these things matter? 
If so, it is very easy for us to collect these metrics. If we had been 
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doing this earlier, and we knew there was a strong link, we might 
have noticed ill-being in a particular cohort well before we got to 
the point of the crisis that we are currently having a hard time 
reversing.
We used a long equation to assess the reported well-being for 
individual i in metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). In these MSAs, 
we looked at life satisfaction today and expected life satisfaction 
over five years, which is a pure optimism question. Then, we looked 
at stress, worry, anger, city satisfaction, and many other factors. We 
also had many controls, which included age, body mass index (BMI), 
gender, education, employment status, marital status, religion, 
and experiencing pain the previous day. Following this gathering 
of information, we added in the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) composite death measure, which includes suicide, 
liver disease, accidental poisoning, and indeterminate deaths, as a 
means to test whether our markers of well-being—and ill-being—
tracked with the mortality rate trends. 
Matching Well-Being Markers with Deaths of Despair
We looked at the individual level and then at an average MSA level 
to see if the metrics of well-being and ill-being matched robustly 
with the deaths of despair. We used the CDC mortality measure 
that encompasses preventable deaths due to opioids and suicide, 
amongst others. Originally, this rate was concentrated among 
individuals between the ages of 45 to 54. Now, this band of deaths 
of despair is closer to ages 35 to 65, as the death rate has increased.
What we found at the individual level was that this MSA composite 
death rate for 35 to 64 year olds is negatively correlated with life 
satisfaction and optimism, and positively correlated with stress 
and worry. This could go two ways. If someone has no hope, and 
they are stressed and worried, they are more likely to fall into this 
death category. However, if someone lives in a place where there 
are many “deaths of despair” around them, it could make them 
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more likely to consume opioids or commit suicide. This research 
finds that the death trends matches very robustly with the well-
being (ill-being) trends. 
Then we looked at the role of place and health behaviors at the 
aggregate level (MSA level). We found that the percent of smokers 
per MSA negatively correlated with life satisfaction, and positively 
correlated with stress, which in turn, correlated with “deaths of 
despair.” The percent age of respondents who exercise positively 
correlated with current and future life satisfaction and negatively 
correlates with stress. (Graham and Pinto, 2017) Then, we started 
to get a picture of places that are more stressed and had worse 
health behaviors.
One characteristic of place is racial diversity. The share of Blacks 
positively correlates with life satisfaction and optimism, but on 
average, negatively correlates with stress. If there are more Blacks, 
and they are more optimistic and less stressed, those results will 
show up at the level of place—then all we need to do is look at a 
map.
Figure 7a and b
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Note: Controls include age, gender, marital status, edducation, employment, 
religious preference, year and month of interview. Optimism is measured 
by best possible life anticipation (BPLA) scores on a 0-10 scale.
Source: Gallup Heathways
 
Note: Controls include age, gender, marital status, edducation, employment, 
religious preference, year and month of interview. Optimism is measured 
by best possible life anticipation (BPLA) scores on a 0-10 scale.
Source: Gallup Heathways
These maps show where Whites were more optimistic and where 
minorities were more optimistic at the state level. The dark 
green states are where minorities are the most optimistic in the 
country. This is controlling for education, employment rates, and 
religious preference. If we look at the southern cluster of states 
(Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas), there is a concentration of 
African American culture and music. However, these are objectively 
deprived places with horrible health indicators. On this graphic, we 
can see very heavily Hispanic-populated places. There is a trend, 
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whether it is shared cultural norms, or simply more diversity, that 
make minorities significantly more optimistic, even in places where 
they are more objectively deprived. This is something we cannot 
fully comprehend, but we can look at the same story for blue-collar 
Whites and see lack of hope and increased stress, all concentrated 
in places that are homogeneously white.
A Snapshot of New Research
We have been trying to understand these differences in resilience 
across races and places, and I have three sets of work happening at 
once. The first set is looking back historically at the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics for the U.S., which has followed people born in 
the States from 1935-1945 until now. It is nationally representative. 
We found that there was an optimism question asked in the study, 
and it asks how someone thinks his or her life will work out on a 
sliding scale.
Respondents who were born between 1935 and 1945, and who 
reported being optimistic in their 20s, were much more likely to 
be alive in 2015, versus the non-optimists. We came across two 
other results that again suggest that if we had been following 
these metrics over time, we might have been quicker to notice the 
“deaths of despair,” or the roots of the “deaths of despair.” 
We also found that women and Blacks increased their optimism 
in the 1970s. They started out as less optimistic than white males 
and quickly became more optimistic from the 1970s on. In contrast, 
less than college-educated Whites began their decline in optimism 
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as early as the 1970s, about the same time that manufacturing 
declined. (O’Connor and Graham, 2018) Again, the research shows 
that we should have noticed the “deaths of despair” earlier, but we 
did not follow well-being, so we were very unaware.
Another study I am working on in Peru involves hope and differential 
levels of resilience, where we find incredibly high education 
aspirations among poor young adults: 85% of our respondents say 
they are going to complete college or proceed to get their post-
graduate education. In order to talk about optimism and hope 
being a good thing, we want to know and test for two things: “Are 
people mispredicting that they are optimistic, when in reality their 
lives are not better, and they are just naturally happy?” and “How 
long does hope and optimism last as a channel?” If someone is 
optimistic despite getting negative shocks, are they resilient? Do 
you retain that? How long does that last? We cannot fully answer 
the last question yet, but we did a test in a new panel from Gallup 
from 2010 to 2014.
Optimists in the first phase of our research do not predict their 
future life satisfaction perfectly. It is hard to do. Yet, they are quite 
close. If someone is asked, “On what point on this scale do you think 
you’ll be in five years,” they tend to retain a very consistent trend 
when asked again in the future. People who report being optimistic 
about the future in the first phase are still very optimistic about the 
future four or five years later, and they actually do better. (Graham 
and Pinto, 2018) We find that on average, they had more income 
gains over that period, and these are not only wealthy respondents, 
it is everybody.
Blacks remain the most optimistic group over time; there is a very 
modest decline in Black optimism, even after looking at the post-
Trump election data for 2017, but the gap between poor Blacks and 
everybody else remains very large.
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To begin the study in Peru, we took four hundred 18 and 19-year-old 
adolescents in a poor or semi-poor urban area—we also included 
whether they had water and electricity, and if there was access 
to a metro. We asked many different questions about household 
demographics, expectations, happiness, education, marital status, 
risky behavior, risky sexual behavior, and drug behavior in a 
confidential survey.
Figure 8 
It is also very important to note that not one of these adolescents 
had a parent who went to college. The parents were mostly 
construction workers, taxi drivers, domestic servants, and trash 
collectors. When we asked the adolescents what level of education 
they would like to complete, 85% of them said they are going to 
receive a college or post graduate education. When we asked in 
a subsequent question whether they thought they could achieve 
that, 95% out of the 85% said yes. (Graham and Ruiz Pozuelo, 2018) 
We also found that the data showed these education aspirations 
matched closely with patterns in education outcomes. Therefore, 
we concluded that when someone has high educational aspirations 
and is optimistic about education in the future, they were more 
likely to complete an education.
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Figure 9
Resilience among Low-Income Young Adults in Peru
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We also found that this correlates with people who have many 
of the innate character traits that I mentioned earlier. Happier 
adolescents were more likely to have high aspirations and believed 
in hard work, which was linked to higher education aspirations. 
(Graham and Ruiz-Pozuelo, 2018) This impatient variable on the 
chart above provides a measure of the discount rate. It shows that 
someone is much less likely to have high aspirations if they will not 
give up money today for investments the future. They are more 
likely to aspire towards a higher education if they believe they have 
more control of their life. 
We also see that adolescents in the high aspirations group have had 
one or more negative shocks. They have been a victim of thievery, 
have a sick person in the household or a parent has walked out 
and left the household. In turn, they are very resilient to negative 
shocks. The only time they are not resilient is when they are sick 
themselves.
We have begun to explore this set of questions in work in Missouri. 
Some of the worst African American blights in the U.S. are in St. 
Louis City. Across the river there are former poor white coal mining 
towns with high opioid misuse. Remarkably, we found that the 
poor Blacks in St. Louis City are still incredibly optimistic, not only 
more so than poor Whites, but also than the rich across Delmar 
Boulevard in St. Louis county. Therefore, when we are able to ask 
the question, “What level of education would you like to complete?” 
in a future survey, we may hear a lot about negative shocks, but we 
posit that poor Blacks will have higher education aspirations than 
poor Whites. 
Conclusion: There are Two Americas
In conclusion, there are two Americas. Research shows that people 
who believe in their future and are hopeful, whether it is because of 
intrinsic motivation, or their capacity to overcome constraints and 
invest in the future, do better. We have data showing big gaps in the 
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U.S. between the poor and the rich, but we also have data showing 
a twist in terms of differences across races. Why do Blacks and 
Hispanics have comparatively lower rates of “deaths of despair?” 
Why are they more resilient? Why are they more hopeful? 
A large factor in this story is the decline of the white working class, 
structural trends in the world economy, tech-driven growth, and 
more competition for low-scale jobs. We saw this in our study that 
took place in the 1970s. Additionally, in the U.S., there is particularly 
high inequality, weak public education, and an approach to welfare 
that stigmatizes recipients. Blue-collar Whites who tend to not trust 
the government, or support welfare programs but traditionally 
had the stable jobs and stable nuclear families, did not have a 
narrative for their futures when the jobs disappeared. They did not 
have the extended social ties and social capital that minorities do. 
Because minorities had faced such discrimination, they had fewer 
expectations about the American dream from the beginning, and 
they did not have access to blue-collar jobs. They had another set 
of narratives—and informal safety nets—in their lives to fall back 
on.
The working, blue-collar man in particular has lost his life narrative, 
and, not surprisingly, this is where we see the biggest percentage of 
prime-age males dropping out of the labor force, misusing opioids, 
and dying prematurely. All of these things are linked, although we 
cannot quite say how. There are also differential levels of resilience 
amongst these groups, which cannot fully be explained. We see it in 
lower suicide rates, but we also see it in the willingness of minority 
men to take other jobs. There are many jobs available in the health 
sector—white women, black men and women, Hispanic men and 
women will take these jobs. The data, however, shows that white 
males are least likely to do so.
Hope matters. We are finding that people with hope do better. We 
do not know how long that channel lasts. It seems to be robust. We 
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know that Blacks and Hispanics have much more of it than Whites, 
at least at the low-income level. We also do not know if hope and 
resilience can be learned. Is that something that we can teach or is 
this just the way it is?
Finally, it is inexpensive to collect well-being metrics. The UK has 
well-being metrics in their official national survey every year. Its 
four questions. It costs almost nothing to include, and the questions 
take little time to answer. We could have been regularly tracking 
this over time and we might have woken up to the problems we are 
currently facing much sooner. We might then have prevented this 
from becoming a social crisis of such a magnitude that it defies any 
one solution.
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